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The limits of reflexive
design in a secrecy-based
organization
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Organizational redesign processes can take many forms from the simple
implementation of an 'off-the-peg' standard solution to a 'carefully tailored' solution
characterized by many iterations of experimentation, evaluation and collective
reflection by various stakeholders. Two key contextual factors affecting such
processes arc culture and decision-making authority. These variables are complex
in themselves and their influence on the redesign process can be moderated by
specific factors. This chapter presents a case which illustrates how efforts to
accommodate collective reflection within an organizational redesign program were
affected by organizational culture and centralized decision-making and how these
effects were heightened by a 'secrecy factor'.
One of the most promising topics to explore in contemporary knowledge-based
organizations concerns productive reflection and learning that takes place during
significant organization restructuring. Reflexive design incorporates aspects of
action research, appreciative inquiry, socio-technical systems and self-design. It
provides unique insights concerning the redesign process and the management of
system wide change (Stebbins and Shani 2002). However, the extent to which
reflexive design might be applied under extreme organizational conditions is
unknown. This chapter investigates the limits of productive reflection and learning
under conditions of secrecy. We will provide a brief overview of ideal reflexive
design and then demonstrate significant gaps between theory and practice through
the examination of the PrimeOptics case. Finally, we will provide observations
about the case and implications for productive reflection in similar organizations.

Organization design
Relatively few theories provide comprehensive frameworks that can shed light on
the chaotic process of redesign (Beer 200 l ). Design is thought to be a blend of
theory, knowledge embedded in the particular industry I sector and work situation
and the contributions of those who participate in the redesign process (Mackenzie
1986). The process is both technical and political, and involves purposeful effort to
design the organization as an integrated system. Moreover, design is treated as a
complex task that aligns the people, resources and work. In today's environment,
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the list of participants in redesign projects may include all key stakeholders, owners,
personnel, customers and suppliers. However little is known about the impact of
including or excluding specific stakeholders. !<or example how does the exclusion .
of non-managerial employees affect redesign outcomes? Will the new design be
less sustainable? In complex organizations, elaborate structural learning
mechanisms arc often created to guide the change program and to foster sound
communications, reflection and learning during all program phases (see for
example, Chapter 9). In contrast, what are the helpful processes, and what are the
outcomes of redesigning work when it is conducted by a few people having similar
backgrounds, making decisions in secret? What are the appropriate types of
involvement, dialogue and reflection, under conditions of secrecy in the change
process?

Reflexive design, reflection and learning
Certain common values have emerged regarding idealized reflexive design. These
values relate to the context for initiating change, the change process and the desired
outcomes. For example, a strong value is dual emphasis on quality of work life and
competitive organizational performance. Both are addressed throughout the change
process through critical evaluation of new designs and their impacts on different
stakeholders. Design is conceived as ·a riflexive methodology of intervention - a rype of
enlightened, se!fcritical process that accepts diffirences in science and practice. By definition,
reflexive design means to mirror or direct back the redesign work. Since the
dictionary definitions are so similar, in this chapter we will freely use the words
reflective and reflexive. Collective reflection is the abiliry to uncover and make explicit
what was planned, observed, or achieved in practice; therrfore it is concerned with the reconstruction
qf meaning and results in work-based learning (Raelin 2000). In the context of a change
program, some new types of reflection and learning are evident. They might
include:
Participants explore vision and goals as well as alternative redesign frameworks.
The stakeholders investigate and choose among redesign approaches that fit
their unique situation (see Figure 7.1 ).
Participants' self-apply theory, methods and practices. In keeping with self
design values, organizational members take ownership of the change process
through high involvement at all stages. In a spirit of inquiry, all parties including
consultants consider both theory and practice, and deliberate on ways to link
them.
Participants arc encouraged to identify and explore the meanings and
implications of possible dilemmas - for example that team-centred designs
might suppress individual creativity.
Design activities are iterative. Deliberations among stakeholders occur through
out the process to assure that redesign produces the desired balanced outcomes.
Self-design and learning from experience arc facilitated (Figure 7.1 ).
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Figure 7.1 Reflective design: a conceptual roadmap

Secrecy as an im.propitious culture and context for collective
reflection
As is illustrated in Chapters 8 and 9 in this volume, the constraints on redesign and
learning can stem from the existing management, culture and organizational
configuration. For example, organization theory suggests that a matrix organization
carries a certain culture of openness, ongoing clash of perspectives, full use of
knowledge worker talents and problem-solving on behalf of customers (Galbraith
1994). However, a defense industry firm with a matrix structure may not have
these characteristics (Landau 2003). Instead, secrecy and competitive pressures
across defense contractors may lead the firm to adopt unique internal processes
that do not encourage workplace learning and knowledge transfer beyond somewhat
isolated work units (cf Schenkel, Chapter 6 in this volume).
Secrecy is a contextual variable as well as a cultural variable. Organizational
culture is usually defined in terms of persistent shared values and behavioural
norms (e.g., Mitroff and Kilmann 1984). Aspects of the culture (e.g. secrecy, in
terms of doing business on a 'need-to-know' basis) are likely to conflict with
principles of ideal reflexive design. We need to explore how learning in general
and productive reflection in particular are advanced under a culture that emphasizes
secrecy.

Vision, goals and criteria
Reflexive design theory advocates local control of design processes and high
participant involvement in the creation of goals and design criteria. Thus this
approach is more of a bottom-up approach to change. The question of how goals
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and design criteria are developed during redesign programs is an interesting issue,
especially under conditions of secrecy. Design criteria are statements that describe,
in ideal terms, what the organization design should accomplish. Design criteria
usually have an action verb; they state that the design should facilitate, promote,
encourage, provide for, or motivate (Nadler and Tushman 1988). Design criteria reflect
the values of the different stakeholders and are written in response to competitive
conditions, the tasks to be executed, the collective sense of current problems and
perceived cause of problems, and other constraints. Design criteria drive the entire
decision-making process and provide links to strategy, technology integration and
the development process that occurs in design cycles. The advantages and limits
of design criteria are explored in the case to follow.

Collaborative design
The design process must consider individual and team capacity to cope with a
changing work. One of the most compelling ~spects of reflexive design is the
emphasis on personal support to employees and learning. Successful redesign work
requires the active involvement of those who must live with the changes as well as
social support mechanisms (Shani and Docherty 2003). During operational
redesign, individual experimentation takes place within the context of group work
and inter-group relationships. Accordingly, reflexive design can be characterized
as 'collaborative design', entailing collaboration among members of the units
directly concerned and also among concerned stakeholders.

Collective reflection
Reflexive design processes must provide space and time for learning and developing
competence in work. This includes providing forums for structured deliberation
within the normal project stages as well as time for spontaneous and unplanned
learning and reflection. The process of change centres on the knowledge and
experience of those who are closest to the work at hand. Learning, coping capacity
and other individual competencies support people as they experiment with new
roles, relationships and work activities (Raelin 2000). Successful transformation
depends upon effort, individual capabilities and sound facilitation of the overall
reflexive design process. The above characteristics are associated with the ideal
process of reflexive design. The redesign process led by managers of PrimeOptics
is captured next. It is used here to highlight aspects of good reflexive design as well as
majorflaws that do not promote productive reflection and learning.

The PrimeOptics case
PrimeOptics is a division of one of the largest defense and aerospace systems
contractors in the United States. With billions of dollars in annual sales this defense
contractor employs many thousands of employees worldwide. The company is
known for its high standards of technological innovation and customer relations,
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as well as for its relatively low employee turnover rates. Despite these positive
factors, at the outset of the case the PrimcOptics division suffered from declining
sales and a lower market share. A customer survey conducted in early 2002 indicated
that PrimeOptics was not considered cost-competitive. 'We love your technology;
it's needed to save lives; we wish we could afford it' was the typical response from
PrimeOptics' customers.
PrimeOptics devoted considerable resources to customer relations and respon
siveness. It had strong program management offices for customer interfaces and a
full spectrum of engineering personnel assigned to the various programs. Each
program was responsible for a family of technologically related products,
throughout their life cycles. Due to the secretive nature of the industry, programs
were developed for specific customers. Program autonomy and internal company
barriers led to non-uniform production and business processes. As a result, the
company was often too slow and expensive in moving from prototypes to efficient
manufacturing.
To address the perceived threat to the company success and survival, an overall
change program was designed, aimed at reducing cycle times, reducing cost of
engineering support, improving the transition from product development work to
production work, and positioning the company to compete in new markets. To
accomplish this, six taskforces were created, one of which is focused here - the
Production Execution group. The group's task was to restructure production
operations and to significantly reduce manufacturing costs. It was expected that
financial and productivity gains would come through a reorganization of
engineering support groups and a breaking up of the PrimeOptics matrix
organization. The explicit intent was to cut engineering support costs by 50%.
PrimeOptics had an embedded matrix structure (see Figure 7 .2), in which the
engineering support groups reported to both production and program management.
There were certain inefficiencies associated with having dozens of mutually
exclusive programs. For example, there were problems connected with allocating
engineering staff in periods of peak and low demands. But PrimeOptics had not
developed cross-program managerial processes to address these and other issues.
The PrimeOptics organization seemed to have all the problems and very few of
the benefits normally associated with matrix structures.

Staffing the taskforce
The vision for the change program called for a shift in decision-making authority
and control from program offices to the factories. Accordingly, management staffed
the production execution taskforce with factory managers and supervisors, and
excluded program offices and engineering support personnel. It was very evident
from the taskforce stafling that management did not want to save the matrix. While
most of the managers on the taskforce were former engineers, only two of the I 0
taskforce members had program office or customer contact experience from prior
jobs. Due to the organizational culture, participation in the taskforce was secret
and few people outside the taskfcJrce knew that it existed or what it was doing.
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Figure 7.2 Organization chart with embedded matrix structure

Time line
The taskforce was created in February 2002. Since some taskforce members were
aware of organization designs in other divisions of the company, they used their
contacts to investigate design innovations that might be adapted to the PrimeOptics
situation. They identified six manufacturing designs that were thought to be
successful elsewhere and seemed to match the vision. They then began to elaborate
them and provide definitions that would allow comparisons. The taskforce met
biweekly, and conducted data gathering between sessions. Ref1ecting on this phase
of the taskforce work, team members later observed that the pace was almost
frantic, even though they worked to a self-imposed deadline. The taskforce proposed
a new strategic design in june 2002. However, after this point there were many
delays in feedback and directives from management and taskforce members became
impatient with the lack of action. The management decision was announced in
November, and the cutover to the new design began in january 2003.

The researchers' role
In late March 2002 the taskforce leader brought in a team of two university
researchers to assist the taskforce and to provide independent opinions and
information on 'state-of-the-art' practice. One researcher was an expert on industrial
engineering, and the other was an expert on organization design. The researchers
began their work by linking the taskforce deliberations to alternative design theories
including reflective design. The idea was to place the taskforce work into a larger
perspective so that the group could consider a wider and more robust set of options.
For example, the researchers felt that work in progress most closely matched the
Nadler and 1 ushman (1988) redesign process. They guided the group through the
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various steps in the Nadler and Tushman process to educate members on
comprehensive design and to allow some critique and reflection on what had been
accomplished and what had not been accomplished. This type of comparison and
discussion among consultants and clients is a key feature of reflective design.
The researchers also helped the group identify issues that would have to be
addressed in the coming design and development stages. They provided the platform
for the taskforce leaders' reflection about both the design process and substantive
issues, and provided their own expert assessment. They also encouraged manage
ment to bring in more stakeholders, but this advice was not acted on. Consistent
with PrimeOptics culture and values, managers stated that the project was kept
secret 'to allow the taskforce maximum freedom in generating alternative designs,
and to avoid rumors'. Accordingly, most other PrimeOptics managers, supervisors
and employees remained in the dark on the redesign process both before and after
recommendations were made.

The organization design process performed by the taskforce
During the period from late March to May, the taskforce developed six alternative
organizational designs. The researchers were unable to participate in all the face
to-face discussions due to distance and time limitations. But they were able to
bombard the group with questions via phone calls and email messages. Based on
the desired future capabilities, the taskforce developed a list of l 0 criteria that
could be used to evaluate the six options. It is noteworthy that design criteria were
created by the taskforce members in relative isolation.
The researchers pointed out that 'people issues' were seldom directly included
in construction of criteria. For example, the 'ability of designs to promote career
paths' criterion was assigned a 3.4% decision weight. The taskforcc norm was to
avoid people and emotional considerations in favour of criteria that emphasized
costs and technical solutions. The PrimeOptics culture, values and norms stressed
engineering objectivity. After the project was completed, several members indicated
that this inhibited frank discussion. On reflection, they indicated that structures
were being created that would benefit specific members of the taskforce, but that
this was deliberately not discussed during meetings. Team members could clearly
sec their potential new roles in the different options being considered but did not
discuss their personal likes and dislikes 'in order to stay objective'.
By the time that the taskforce began deliberations on the best choices, the
researchers were again on the scene. Consistent with the original objectives, the
group focused on two alternative designs that decentralized engineering and
program office activities to the factory, breaking up the matrix. At this critical
stage the researchers raised several issues for collective reflection:

•
•

Arc the leading alternatives significantly different fi·om each other?
Would either of the models facilitate the expressed needs of other taskforces?
How would the models perform under scrutiny of other stakeholders?
How risky are these models to the company's main strengths · innovation
and customer responsiveness?
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The taskforce members welcomed these points being raised, but they did not feel
that time or additional resources could be spent on questions raised by the
researchers. Keeping a self-imposed deadline for presenting their final design
seemed ~ore important than following a reflexive design process that might take
several more weeks of work. Instead, taskforce members combined the best elements
of the two models and submitted one design to top management.
Top management took four months to design their own solution retaining key
features of the matrix organization (Figure 7 .3). This was surprising to all parties
given the initial overwhelming management sentiment against the matrix. The
taskforce leader was especially shocked because he had informal contacts with
other taskforces and was not at all aware of top management intentions. He felt
that the redesign was significant in the sense of new factory authority over certain
engineering support groups, but he did not understand why other elements of the
proposed design were rejected. The matrix would be retained, with little hope for
achieving major cost reductions. Much of the past sense of urgency and crisis
faded away. With a return to company profitability, top management expected to
make few cuts in staffing.
Injanuary 2003 the taskforce leaders and researchers took stock of the situation.
It was apparent that top management had abandoned the vision, values and
rationale behind the change program. Taskforce members did not know why the
new design was selected or how it might be justified. That is, without the crisis of
high support costs and need fi)r downsizing, what would management and the
taskforce members communicate to the workforce as the reason behind the
significant changes in organization design?

The transition process and dynamics
The researchers, hoping to broaden participation and to foster a spirit of reflection
and learning, proposed an elaborate structural learning mechanism. This
mechanism would tightly link in human resources, training, information systems
and other support services commonly required in the cutover to new designs (see
Chapters 8 and 9). However, the newly appointed production executive chose
instead a simple implementation group of four sub-team leaders (all managers)
and an overall transition team leader. Since some of the newly appointed transition
team members had not been involved in the prior process, the group took time to
revisit earlier taskforcc decisions. With a better understanding of past options
considered as well as top management's strategic design, the group began to alter
the operational design of the factories. This activity was 'design on the fly'. New
work emerged from collective reflection on the current situation and experiences,
a feature of reflexive design. The transition group had freedom to redesign work
on the shop f1oor, and selectively began to involve work teams in experimentation
with new work methods and production processes. Compared to the prior taskforce
the team did not have to worry about approvals as it had authority to put changes
in place immediately. The researchers observed that this type of collaboration and
involvement with employees had seldom been seen earlier in the change program.
As the transition team conducted its work, they encountered some obstacles to
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Figure 7.3 New modified matrix following redesign

innovation and efficiency. The transition team felt that the new design could not
achieve full potential until dedicated engineering staff members were physically
co-located in the factories. However, there simply was not enough space in the
factories for engineering staff, and the transition team had to alter this important
aspect of the operational design.

Discussion
Reflections on the case and the scope of the redesign process
Reflexive design theory is a useful framework for analysis of the PrimeOptics case.
According to theory, the quality of deliberations and discussion at all stages of
redesign work is crucial to achievement of balanced results. Moreover, the reflexive
design approach calls for high involvement from all parties and self-application of
theory, methods and practices. In the PrimeOptics case, important stakeholders
were left out from the start. This had serious implications for the construction of
the vision and goals, self-design activities, the scope and time for reflective learning,
and managerial capacity to adopt a systemic view of outcomes. In the larger change
program, learning and reflection were not perceived as important elements in the
change process. Leaders and members of the various taskforces did not regularly
meet to share progress and discuss problems, and were not aware of potential
impacts of their own activities on others. The top manager kept abreast of taskforce
activities but missed opportunities for synergy and reflective learning at all
management and employee levels. Thus the various taskforces had a restricted
view of the internal environment and shifting priorities. This was demonstrated
most dramatically by the rejection of the production execution taskforce
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recommendations. Top management decided not to cut engineering support costs
by 50%, and decided to retain basic elements of the matrix organization. Overall,
the decision-making was top-down, except for the generation of taskforce
recommendations. Lack of dialogue up and down the hierarchy seriously limited
productive reflection, learning and commitment to the strategic design.
At the taskforce level, conditions were much better. Considering our earlier list
of new types of reflection and learning (see 'Reflexive design, reflection and
learning', p. 31 ), some aspects of reflexive design were handled quite well. Task
force participants explored goals, alternative redesign models and developed design
criteria. The group clearly adopted an approach in agreement with PrimeOptics'
unique culture and situation. Taskforce members were able to self-apply theory,
methods and practices and assumed strong ownership of the change process.
However, they also set unrealistic deadlines and sacrificed opportunities for collective
reflection to meet self-imposed project milestones. Management and the taskforce
did not regard design work as iterative, or that it should receive attention beyond
the rather 'closed' taskforce membership. The redesign taskforce did not check
their work with top management or any other group and thus left themselves open
for criticism and the eventual surprise of seeing their suggestion replaced by a new
design passed down from top management.
It is noteworthy that the taskforce simply passed on its recommendations, and
did not seriously engage in discussions with top management. This continued the
group's pattern of avoiding conflict, discussions of differences and consideration
of emotional or non-technical issues. In retrospect, taskforce members reflected
that a great deal of time was wasted on development of design criteria, quantitative
ratings of the alternative designs, and merging the two leading models. These
considerations had little to do with the design created by top management. They
felt that the time might have been devoted to conversations with the top manager
so that the final strategic design could reflect their knowledge of conditions in the
factory and how the design might be implemented. Both the PrimeOptics culture
and locus of decision making seemed to block meaningful dialogue.
Reflective design processes include time for learning and development of new
competencies. This includes deliberations within normal project stages as well as
time for spontaneous and unplanned learning and reflection (Stebbins and Shani
2002). This is especially important as redesign shifts toward implementation and
people need support experimenting with new roles, relationships and work activities.
As noted in the case, management did not see the need to create a transition
support infrastructure that would support experimentation, training and learning
at operating levels. Implementation was left to a small management team.
Production process changes were initiated with selected work teams, and the
implementation group modified the strategic design to account for various obstacles
and factory realities. These initiatives produced the kinds of collaborative design,
productive reflection and learning that researchers hoped to see during the overall
program.
Reflexive design authors and consultants promote a systemic view of values
based outcomes. Dual emphasis on quality of work life and competitive organiz

90

M. Stebbins, T. Freed, A.B. 'Rami' Shani and K Doerr

ational performance is a core value (Docherty et al. 2002). PrimeOptics, however,
rarely considered the intellectual, emotional or physical needs of employees as it
established a vision and goals, conducted self-design activities and implemented
the riew design. Low involvement of employees, customers and other stakeholders
led to myopia, sub-optimization and considerable wasted effort during the strategic
design stages. In this respect, the PrimeOptics case is an example of how not to
carry out reflexive design.

Reflective practice during redesign
Reflexive design theory is in part based on Self-Design thinking (Mohrman and
Cummings 1989; Weick 1977) and it is a design process characterized by multiple
iterations. As different stakeholders enter the picture, goals, design criteria and
new designs are subjected to continuous scrutiny and modification. Design work
often cycles back to earlier stages, incorporating new values, ideas and information.
This occurred when the researchers entered the picture and led a comprehensive
review of design approaches and ideal theory compared to taskforce activities. It
also occurred later, as the new transition team members studied earlier design
work and made operational design changes at implementation. Despite these limited
connections to reflexive design theory, it can be concluded that the PrimeOptics
redesign process had serious flaws in leaving out the principal stakeholder, top
management. It is not clear that additional redesign cycles involving other
stakeholders would have been productive, since management rejected most ideas
proposed by the taskforce. There was time available for productive reflection and
learning with other stakeholders, but the real opportunity existed between the
taskforce and top management.
In the absence of sound structural learning mechanisms to stimulate new
conversations, what can be tried to trigger learning in a secrecy-based organization?
The case suggests that researchers/consultants can create ad hoc or temporary
forums, different from the client's typical style of running meetings and conducting
the design process. This was accomplished when the researchers presented and
led discussions about alternative design theories, and when they asked difficult
questions about the value of proposed designs. Therefore, educational interventions
and expert consulting, if co-operatively sponsored by both researchers and clients,
show high promise for stimulating productive reflection and learning in secretive
organizations.

Reflective design under secrecy conditions
We viewed secrecy as both a contextual and organization culture variable. The
challenges encountered in the effort reported in this chapter were magnified by
the embedded phenomenon of secrecy or the 'need-to-know' culture. As we said
earlier, collective reflection is the ability to uncover and make explicit what one
has planned, observed or achieved in practice··- therefore it is concerned with the
creation of collective meaning. Thus, by its very nature, ref1exive design

7he limits

rif reflexive design

91

requirements emphasize the need for high involvement of all the stakeholders in
the reflection process, in the exploration of alternative solutions and in the creation
of shared meaning. Thus 'secretive' culture significantly limits the ability to fully
engage in reflective or reflexive design.
\,Ye discovered in this study that the challenge is even greater when the secrecy
based culture is coupled with an organizational configuration that is more like
machine bureaucracy than adhocracy or matrix. PrimeOptics relied on the
hierarchy to get things done and did not have many of the characteristics associated
with matrix culture and problem-solving processes. Many limits to productive
reflection and learning were identified and addressed in this chapter. We observed
low involvement of employees and other stakeholders in decision making and
restricted communications between sub-units and levels. The organization as a
whole was not used to experimenting with opposite ways of relating and working.
However, on a local level, the taskforce manager took steps to open up the redesign
process by welcoming outside researchers and modifying deliberations when
researchers were present. Some reflexive design was possible at the taskforce level
in this secrecy-based company, even without an umbrella of support from top
management. We can conclude from our case example that advancement of
reflexive design in a secrecy-based organization requires greater involvement of
top managers and other stakeholders in the process and willingness to explore
both technical and social considerations during redesign.
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